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Articles
“THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, . . .”: REFLECTIONS ON THE
STASIS OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
WILLIAM R. CORBETT*
I. DE´JA` VU ALL OVER AGAIN
YOU know the story of political change and static labor law in theUnited States: the party in power changes from time to time, but the
labor law remains the same.  Consider the following illustrative story.
The story begins as a Democratic President is elected.  He is elected
to succeed a Republican—President George Bush.  During the presiden-
tial campaign, the Democratic nominee pledged to organized labor his
support for the proposed legislation that was labor’s top priority item, and
organized labor vigorously supported his election.  The bill would have
amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1 in a way that held
some promise of reinvigorating unions and strengthening organized la-
bor.  Passage of the bill was organized labor’s chief legislative objective,
just as defeat of the bill was the principal goal of the business community.
However, the new President’s legislative priority was health care reform,
which he undertook with the support of organized labor.  While focusing
on health care reform, the President signed an employment bill, the first
bill he signed into law, but it was not the one that organized labor most
fervently desired: it was an employment law, not a labor law.2  More than a
year into the new Administration, prospects for passage of the labor bill
dimmed.  It appeared questionable whether sixty votes could be mustered
in the Senate to invoke cloture and avoid a Republican-led filibuster.
*  William R. Corbett 2011.  Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University.  I thank Professors Michael J.
Zimmer and William B. Gould IV for reviewing and commenting on earlier drafts
of this essay.  I thank Ellen Miletello, LSU Law Center Class of 2012, for her
research assistance.  I am grateful for a summer research grant from the LSU Law
Center.
1. The current NLRA is the Wagner Act, as amended by chapter 120 of the
Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and the Landrum-Griffin Amend-
ments of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.  The NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (2006).
2. In the United States, we distinguish between labor law and employment
law.  Labor law refers to law governing union representation and collective bar-
gaining—primarily the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act.  Employment law is the
label for individual employment rights laws, such as the employment discrimina-
tion laws and the wage and hour laws. See infra, Part III.A. See generally, Benjamin I.
Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2688-89 (2008)
(discussing distinction between labor law and employment law but noting division
is not always clear).
(227)
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Then, an election to replace a long-serving Democratic senator produced
a surprising Republican victory, further diminishing the prospects for
bringing the labor bill to a vote on the Senate floor.  By summer, everyone
agreed that the labor bill was dead.  Once again, organized labor had put
its money and support behind a Democrat who won the Presidency with
control of both congressional chambers, and yet the bill it desperately
wanted enacted had died a quiet death.
Yes, you know the story of the Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act
(WFA),3 which died in the Senate in 1994.  Oh, that was not the proposed
legislation that you were thinking about?  Perhaps you had in mind the
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA),4 which did not make it to the Senate
floor in 2010 and now seems dead.  For organized labor, the demise of the
EFCA, the latest holy grail of labor law reform, is “de´ja` vu all over again.”5
A. The Workplace Fairness Act
The WFA would have amended the NLRA to prohibit the hiring of
permanent replacements during economic strikes, overturning a 1938 Su-
preme Court decision.6  The bill was crucial to organized labor because
the right to hire permanent replacements during strikes and, more impor-
tantly, the ability legally to threaten to hire such replacements, essentially
has rendered the strike, which once was labor’s nuclear option,7 a feckless
3. H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 55, 103d Cong. (1993).  The bill was passed
by the United States House of Representatives on June 15, 1993. See Clifford
Krauss, House Passes Bill to Ban Replacement of Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at
A9.  The Senate took a vote on whether to invoke cloture and cut off debate, but
the vote fell short of the required sixty votes. See Jack Germond & Jules Witcover,
Labor Dealt Blow Again in Defeat of Striker Bill, BALT. SUN, July 15, 1994, http://
articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-07-15/news/1994196170_1_organized-labor-strik
er-replacement-unfair-labor-practices.
4. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
5. This is one of the many famous quotes attributed to baseball manager Yogi
Berra. See Yogi-isms, YOGI BERRA: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://www.yogiberra.
com/yogi-isms.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (listing quotes attributed to Berra);
Yogi Berra, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yogi_Berra (last modified
June 15, 2011) (same).
6. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (stating
that NLRA did not require employer to reinstate replaced workers who had partici-
pated in economic strike).  As has been often pointed out, the declaration in the
opinion that employers can hire permanent replacements for economic strikers
was dictum. See, e.g., Robert B. Moberly, Labor-Management Relations During the Clin-
ton Administration, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 31, 50 (2006).
7. Although it has been the law since at least 1938 that employers could per-
manently replace economic strikers, it was very rare for employers to threaten to
hire permanent replacements until recent times. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt & Benjamin C. Ellis, The Relative Bargaining Power of Employers and Unions
in the Global Information Age: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Japan, 20
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) (stating that “[a]lthough permanent
replacements were rarely implemented in the years immediately after the adoption
of the MacKay doctrine, American employers have shown an increased willingness
to resort to permanent replacements since the late 1970s”); see also Jack J.
Canzoneri, Comment, Management’s Attitudes and the Need for the Workplace Fairness
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weapon.  A vivid demonstration of this point came during the election
year in 1992 when a strike at Caterpillar factories in Illinois by United
Auto Workers (UAW)-represented employees collapsed when Caterpillar
threatened to hire permanent replacements.8  Bill Clinton, the presiden-
tial candidate, pledged his support for the WFA.9  When Clinton was
elected, he made health care reform his focus, and along the way, less
than a month after he took office, the first bill he signed into law was the
Family and Medical Leave Act.10  When President Clinton took office,
there were fifty-six Democrats in the Senate.  The seat of Texas Senator
Lloyd Bentsen became vacant when he was named Secretary of the Trea-
sury in the Clinton White House.11  The victory of Republican Kay Bailey
Hutchison over Democrat Bob Krueger, whom the Texas governor had
appointed to fill the seat until the special election, virtually assured that
the striker replacement bill would never come to the Senate floor.12  Some
commentators opined that President Clinton did not put forth herculean
effort to force a Senate vote.13
Act, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 229 (1993) (“[D]uring the 1980s and early 1990s, man-
agement has increasingly used, threatened to use, and had the propensity to use
permanent replacements, a drastic change from the period prior to 1980 when use
of permanent replacements was rare.”).
8. See Peter T. Kilborn, Caterpillar’s Trump Card; Threat of Permanently Replacing
Strikers Gave Company Advantage Against Union, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1992, at A1.
9. See Dogged Democrat Nears Victory: Gov. Clinton Wins Union Label, THE MACHIN-
IST, May 1992, at 1 (quoting Governor Clinton as saying, “ ‘I don’t think it’s fair to
tell workers they have the right to strike, and then tell them that means the right to
lose their jobs’”); see also Karen Tumulty, Striker Bill Clears House as Battle Looms in
Senate, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A1 (referring to White House endorsement of
WFA as “fulfill[ing] a campaign promise to a key constituency”).  Governor Clin-
ton also visited the striking Caterpillar workers to show his support. See Cynthia
Todd, Clinton Backs Strikers’ Rights: He Endorses Bill to Ban Replacements, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 1992, at A1 (discussing Governor Clinton’s comments to
union members).
10. See Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2006)); Moberly, supra note 6, at 32 (noting that Family and Medical Leave Act
was first bill signed by President Clinton).
11. See Gebe Martinez & J. Michael Kennedy, Texas Gov. Richards to Appoint
Krueger to Replace Sen. Bentsen, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at A12.
12. See Tumulty, supra note 9 (noting that recent Senate election adversely
affected prospects of striker replacement bill); see also Bill to Ban Striker Replacements
Still Faces Tough Climb in Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at AA-1 (Apr. 15,
1993) (forecasting simple passage of bill in House of Representatives but potential
filibuster in Senate); Senate Ratio Changes with Hutchison Victory, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 108, at D-16 (June 8, 1993) (reporting that Senate election result is
“setback for labor leaders”).
13. See, e.g., Don McIntosh, The Broken Promise of U.S. Labor Law, Part Two,
NORTHWEST LABOR PRESS, July 2, 1999, available at http://www.nwlaborpress.org/
1999/7-02-99NLRB2.html (arguing that President Clinton put less effort into pas-
sage of this bill than into passage of North American Free Trade Agreement); cf.
NLRB Member Devaney Tells Management to Prepare for Bumpy Ride with New Board,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at D-10 (May 18, 1994) (discussing rumor in Wash-
ington, D.C. that President Clinton was not willing to “twist arms,” including those
of two Arkansas senators, to win passage of Act).  President Clinton subsequently
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B. The Employee Free Choice Act
In 2009, the EFCA was labor’s make-or-break bill.14  Since a 1974 Su-
preme Court decision,15 employers, when confronted with demands for
recognition by unions based on signed authorization cards, could refuse
to recognize the union, regardless of the level of support indicated by the
cards, and instead wait for the union to file a petition for election with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  Organized labor long has ar-
gued that the limited means of recognition has been a significant cause of
unions not enjoying more success in being certified as employees’ collec-
tive bargaining representatives.16  The EFCA would have amended the
NLRA to provide for certification of unions based on cards signed by a
majority of an appropriate bargaining unit.17
While campaigning for President, Barack Obama pledged his support
for the proposed EFCA, and organized labor supported his candidacy.18
When President Obama took office, health care reform was the focus of
his legislative agenda.  Less than a month after his inauguration, President
issued an Executive Order that prohibited the federal government from con-
tracting with employers that hired permanent replacements for strikers, but the
D.C. Circuit invalidated the order. See Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Execu-
tive Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 285-87 (2001)
(arguing that President Clinton tried to use executive order to accomplish failed
legislative goal).
14. H.R. 1409 and S. 560 were just the latest iterations of the EFCA.  The
House passed an earlier version, H.R. 800, on March 1, 2007, but the companion
bill S. 1041 was withdrawn after a motion to invoke cloture failed. See Steven
Greenhouse, Senate Republicans Block Labor Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/washington/26cnd-labor.html?_r=1&sq=“employ
eefreechoiceact=&st=cse”=&scp=10&pagewanted=print (considering defeat of
Democrats’ attempt to pass union-favored bill).
15. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). Lin-
den Lumber was not new law; in it the Court adopted the position of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). See id. at 304-05 (citing earlier case law and Board
decisions).
16. Although unions win a significant percentage of elections held, Professor
Gould points out that this is not the salient statistic, as many unions have eschewed
the election route by filing petitions for elections only when they have a very good
chance of winning. See William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009,
Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management
Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 302 n.43 (2008) [hereinafter
Gould, The Employee Free Choice Act] (discussing trend towards fewer union
elections).
17. The Act also would have amended the NLRA to provide for mediation
and arbitration if first collective bargaining agreements are not achieved in speci-
fied periods along with enhanced remedies for unfair labor practices during peri-
ods of union organizing.  William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on
an Old Theme: Is the Employee Free Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009)
[hereinafter Gould, New Labor Law Reform] (reviewing history of labor relations
reform and discussing effects of EFCA proposal).
18. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, After Push for Obama, Unions Seek New Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A33 (noting that unions supported Obama and then
hoped for President’s support for union initiatives).
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Obama signed his first law, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which
amended employment discrimination statutes to overturn a Supreme
Court decision which had restrictively interpreted the limitations period
for filing charges for pay discrimination.19  By the time health care reform
had passed, a special election to fill the late Senator Edward Kennedy’s
seat in the Senate resulted in a stunning Republican victory that cost the
Democrats a filibuster-proof sixty votes in the Senate.20  Although the
Obama Administration reiterated its support for the EFCA21 after the Mas-
sachusetts election, labor’s top legislative initiative appeared to be dead by
summer 2010,22 and there were no signs of vitality at the end of 2010.23
C. The Dunlop Commission
In addition to the mirror image debacles of the WFA and the EFCA,
another unsuccessful effort at labor law reform by a Democratic Adminis-
tration is noteworthy.  In early 1993, the Clinton Administration ap-
pointed the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations,
better known as the Dunlop Commission for chair John T. Dunlop, a for-
mer Secretary of Labor.24  The Commission’s charge was to evaluate what
changes should be made in the laws governing collective bargaining “to
enhance productivity, employee participation, labor-management cooper-
ation, and resolution of workplace problems by the parties themselves.”25
When the Commission delivered its recommendations in December 1994,
the proposals were dead on arrival, coming one month after the Republi-
cans swept into power under the “Contract with America.”26
19. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  For a discussion of the Act, see Charles A. Sullivan, Raising
the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 563 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2010, at A1 (describing Senator Brown as “a little-known Republican state
senator [who] rode an old pickup truck and a growing sense of unease among
independent voters to an extraordinary upset . . . in the overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic state of Massachusetts”).
21. See Michelle Amber, Biden Tells Labor Chiefs that Administration Is Not Aban-
doning Their Priorities Like EFCA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at A-12 (Mar. 2,
2010) (chronicling Vice President Biden’s reassurances to labor that Administra-
tion would support EFCA).
22. See Derrick Cain, Harkin Says He Does Not Have Enough Votes to Approve
EFCA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 92, at A-8 (May 5, 2010) (quoting Senator Har-
kin as saying, “We were within one vote, but something happened in
Massachusetts”).
23. See Derrick Cain, New House Labor Chairman Kline Plans Focus on Job Crea-
tion, Leaner Government, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 237, at A-7 (Dec. 10, 2010)
(discussing new labor priorities of new Republican majority).
24. See, e.g., Barbara Presley Noble, At Work; Labor-Management Rorschach Test,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1994, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501
EED61E3BF936A35755C0A962958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
25. Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Law Reform, 12 LAB.
LAW. 117, 120 (1996).
26. See id. at 121; Moberly, supra note 6, at 49.
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Part of the 1993-1994 story during the Clinton Administration was not
reprised in 2009-2010 because President Obama did not appoint a com-
mission analogous to the Dunlop Commission.  However, there was an am-
ple backlog of employment bills pending in Congress when President
Obama took office.  Although he signed into law the Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, the fate of the Paycheck Fairness Act,27 the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009,28 the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009,29 and others
may have been sealed by the midterm elections of November 2010, when
the Republicans gained control of the House and eroded the Democrats’
majority in the Senate.30  Indeed, shortly after the midterm elections, the
Paycheck Fairness Act met its demise.31
II. SEISMIC SHIFTS IN POLITICS AND LABOR LAW REFORM IN
OTHER NATIONS
The striking similarity of the stories in 1993-1994 and 2009-2010 illus-
trates a point about labor law in the United States: in recent decades, shifts
in political power have not resulted in significant changes in labor law.32
27. H.R. 12, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009).
28. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
29. H.R. 2981, 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009).
30. See, e.g., The Republicans Strike Back, THE ECONOMIST DEMOCRACY IN AM.
BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010, 7:11 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyin
america/2010/11/mid-term_elections_0.
31. See Senate Vote 249—To Advance the Paycheck Fairness Act, N.Y. TIMES, http://
politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/111/senate/2/249 (last visited Dec. 30,
2010) (detailing Senate vote taken on November 17, 2010, that fell two votes short
of invoking cloture).
32. The failure to amend the NLRA is not limited to Presidents Clinton and
Obama.  During President Carter’s Administration, there was an attempt through
the Labor Reform Act of 1977 to strengthen the remedies under the NLRA.  That
effort failed. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor
Law Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L.
REV. 97, 134-35 (2009) (noting failure of Labor Reform Act of 1977); Samuel Es-
treicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act Without Statu-
tory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 1-2 (2009) (noting attempts at labor
reform during Carter, Clinton, and Obama Administrations).  Although one might
guess that Republican Administrations and Republican-led Congresses have weak-
ened the worker protections under United States law, the NLRA has not been
significantly amended since 1959. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of Ameri-
can Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002).  Professor William B. Gould
points out that the retreat of Democratic presidential candidates on reform of the
NLRA goes back to Governor Adlai Stevenson’s vacillating repudiation of the prior
pledge of the Democratic Party to repeal the Taft-Harley Act amendments of the
NLRA. See William B. Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 81 YALE L.J. 1421, 1422 (1972) [hereinafter Gould,
Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain].  A persuasive argument, however, can be made
that the NLRB has diluted employees’ rights and protections through its interpre-
tations of the NLRA at various times.  For example, the AFL-CIO filed a complaint
with the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Committee on Freedom of
Association, alleging that a series of NLRB decisions during President George W.
Bush’s two terms constituted violations of two fundamental conventions of the
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Juxtapose that phenomenon with that of political changes and associated
labor law changes in other nations.  Consider the United Kingdom as an
example.  Political power changes in the last four decades have wrought
dramatic changes in labor law in the United Kingdom.  When the Conserv-
atives came to power under Prime Minister Edward Heath in 1971, the
government began to pass statutes to reign in powerful unions, which had
flourished in an absence of regulation.33  The Industrial Relations Act of
1971 ushered in the new regulation.34  The Labour Party government sub-
sequently repealed the law.35  The pendulum swung again, however, and
the curtailing of union power hit full stride with the election of the next
Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in 1979.  Under Prime
Minister Thatcher and her successor John Major, the laws were changed to
substantially weaken unions.36  Union density and power significantly de-
clined.  As commentators explained:
ILO. See Complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association by the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Concern-
ing the United States Government’s Violations of Freedom of Association and Col-
lective Bargaining by Failing to Enforce the National Labor Relations Act at 10-41,
ILO Case No. 2608 (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/
id/mamr-78btn4/$File/ILOcomplaint.pdf.  For reflections on the Bush NLRB
from a Board member, see Wilma B. Liebman, Values and Assumptions of the Bush
NLRB: Trumping Workers’ Rights, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 643, 643 (2009) (stating “the Bush
NLRB reflects no shortage of decisions that are odd, irrational, or inconsistent
with the received wisdom”).  The NLRB under President Reagan has been charac-
terized as being radically anti-union. See Gould, The Employee Free Choice Act, supra
note 16, at 330 (noting, as former NLRB Chairman, “rather severe anti-unionism
promoted by the Reagan Board in the 1980s”).
33. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative
Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan Under the Bargain-
ing Model, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 137 (2000) (discussing how “until re-
cently [the United Kingdom] has been remarkably devoid of any regulation of the
conduct of industrial relations”). See generally Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Brit-
ain, supra note 32 (discussing Industrial Relations Act of 1971).
34. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 33, at 137-38 (distinguishing labor regulation
in United Kingdom from significantly more expansive regulation in United
States); William B. Gould IV, Recognition Laws: The U.S. Experience and Its Relevance to
the U.K., 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 11, 11 (1998) [hereinafter Gould, Recognition
Laws] (noting fulfillment of promise by Conservative party to enact comprehensive
labor law reform); Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain, supra note 32, at 1423
(explaining that Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was “the first comprehensive leg-
islation relating to labor management relations in the United Kingdom [and that]
[t]he legislation attempted to both restrict union abuses in the collective bargain-
ing arena and provide statutory protection for unions and employees”).
35. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 33, at 138 (arguing that labor reform proved
unpopular and was quickly repealed).
36. See, e.g., id.; Gould, Recognition Laws, supra note 34, at 11; John Pencavel,
The Appropriate Design of Collective Bargaining Systems: Learning from the Experience of
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 447, 464-67 (1999);
see also Raymond J. Friel, Blair’s Third Way—Thatcher’s Enduring Legacy, 48 U. KAN.
L. REV. 861, 875 (2000) (describing Thatcher’s successful effort to “denude” un-
ions of power).
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The sharp union decline in Britain that dates from 1979 is by
now well known.  Aggregate union density showed a remarkable
stability in the postwar period (at around 40-45% membership),
followed by a sharp rise in the 1970s, but then an even sharper
fall from the late 1970s onward.  Since 1979 aggregate union
density has trended downward so that, by the end of the 1990s,
less than 30% of workers were members of trade unions.37
The election of Prime Minister Tony Blair and the “New Labour”
Party in 1997 was a significant change in political power that was accompa-
nied by significant changes in the labor law of the United Kingdom.
While the New Labour Party broke from the decidedly pro-union leanings
and affiliation of the “Old Labor” Party,38 it did usher in significant labor
law changes after many years of Conservative leadership.39  For example,
in an attempt to reverse the weakening of unions, a statutory recognition
procedure was enacted in the Employment Relations Act 1999, giving un-
ions another avenue to gain recognition as collective bargaining repre-
sentatives.40  On the other hand, New Labour did not repeal many of the
37. See Stephen Machin & Stephen Wood, Human Resource Management as a
Substitute for Trade Unions in British Workplaces, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 201, 203
(2005).  The decline in union density in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2003
was 15.5%. See Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, 129 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 38, 45 tbl.3 (2006) (charting union membership decline).  While union
density in the private sector decreased, density in the public sector has remained
relatively stable. See The Ties That (Still) Bind, THE ECONOMIST, June 10, 2006, at 22,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/7041097/print. See generally (Govern-
ment) Workers of the World Unite!, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2011, at 35, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/17849199 (referencing lack of decline in union
density within public sector).
38. See Clint Bolick, Thatcher’s Revolution: Deregulation and Political Transforma-
tion, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 527, 545 (1995) (explaining that New Labour “recanted
[the Labour Party’s] blind obedience to labor unions”).
39. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 33, at 138; Sandra Fredman, The Ideology
of New Labour Law, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 9 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds.,
2004); Claire Kilkpatrick, Has New Labour Reconfigured Employment Legislation?, 32
INDUS. L.J. 135, 148-49 (2003) (discussing effect of European Union regulations on
New Labour).
40. See generally Nancy Peters, The United Kingdom Recalibrates the U.S. National
Labor Relations Act: Possible Lessons for the United States?, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
227 (2004) (comparing labor reform in United States and United Kingdom).  The
statute included incentives for the employer to opt for voluntary recognition
rather than going the route of statutory recognition. See id. at 241-42 (discussing
incentives added to labor relations process).  For an informed review of the new
statutory recognition procedure concluding that it encourages voluntary recogni-
tion, but not collective bargaining, see Ruth Dukes, The Statutory Recognition Proce-
dure 1999: No Bias in Favour of Recognition?, 37 INDUS. L.J. 236, 237 (2008).  While
observing that there has been an increase in recognitions since the statutory proce-
dures were enacted, Dukes argues that the statute “ignores the fundamental differ-
ence between voluntary and statutory recognition: namely, that in the case of
statutory recognition, the role of legislation should be to persuade an otherwise
unwilling employer to negotiate.” See id. at 266.  Dukes also discusses the criticisms
of the statutory recognition procedures by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the
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unfavorable laws enacted by the Conservative Government,41 generally
favoring laws facilitating employee-employer “partnerships” rather than
union-management relations.42  Nonetheless, the decimation of unions
through legislation ended and New Labour enacted some laws favorable
to unions and even more protecting individual workers.  Many of the labor
and employment reforms followed from Prime Minister Blair’s signing
onto the European Union Social Charter from which the United Kingdom
had opted out until Blair’s election.43  In the first year after the election of
a new coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in
2010,44 the early indications are that another major shift in the labor law
policy has begun in the United Kingdom.  Consider, for example, the new
government’s proposals for substantially reforming the United Kingdom’s
employment tribunals.45  If the government proceeds with the proposed
Application of Conventions and Recommendations. See id. at 238-39, 260-64 (dis-
cussing Committee’s reasons for concluding that statutory recognition procedure
does not satisfy ILO Convention 98 on Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining).
41. See Friel, supra, note 36, at 890 (“Anti-union legislation was not repealed
upon Labour’s election.”); see also James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The
Perils and Promises of Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 131 n.140
(2004) (“The Employment Relations Act of 1999, enacted by the Labour Party,
means no change in the restrictive provisions of the prior Thatcher legislation
dealing with secondary pressure.”).
42. See Charles B. Craver, Book Review, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 548, 548-
49 (2002) (reviewing TONIA NOVITZ & PAUL SKIDMORE, FAIRNESS AT WORK: A CRITI-
CAL ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 1999 AND ITS TREATMENT OF COL-
LECTIVE RIGHTS (2001)) (discussing authors’ disappointment with Blair
government’s failure to enact laws more supportive of unions); see also Friel, supra
note 36, at 890-91 (discussing Blair’s vision as not including an enhanced collective
role for unions).
43. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 33, at 38; D. Bruce Shine, The European
Union’s Lack of Internal Borders in the Practice of Law: A Model For the United States?, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 207, 211 (2002) (suggesting Social Charter is
“[p]erhaps the most significant non-legislative event”).
44. See, e.g., A Compromising Position, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2011, at 20, avail-
able at http://www.economist.com/node/17849447?story_id=17849447 (discussing
election of coalition consisting of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and vote
reactions to coalition rule).
45. The most significant change likely to occur is a major reform of the em-
ployment tribunals.  The new coalition government initiated a review of the em-
ployment tribunals, which were created in 1964.  In January 2011, the government
released the product of that review. See DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS,
RESOLVING WORKPLACE DISPUTES: A CONSULTATION (2011), available at http://www.
bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/employment-matters/docs/r/11-511-resolving-work
place-disputes-consultation.  The review stems from the premise that there have
been too many cases (particularly involving unfair dismissals) and an overabun-
dance of frivolous claims in the tribunals, costing businesses too much money. See
id. at 15, 27-28.  The consultation closed on April 20, 2011.  If the government
moves forward with the recommended reforms, there will be a number of changes
favorable to employers, including several disincentives for employees to assert
claims such as required deposits and enhanced cost shifting.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\56-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 10 11-NOV-11 13:15
236 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: p. 227
changes, the employment tribunals will become less hospitable forums for
workers to assert their claims.
Another nation exemplifying political power shifts and concomitant
major labor law changes is France.  With the ascendancy in 2007 of Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy and his party, the Union for a Popular Movement,
the center-right President said that he would “break with the past” and
change France’s rigid labor market and bring unemployment rates down
from 8.85% to 5% by the end of his five-year term in 2012.46  Notwith-
standing the failure of his predecessor, President Jacques Chirac, to effect
significant labor law reform,47 the Sarkozy government embarked upon
significant reforms.48  These reforms included the evisceration of the
thirty-five-hour workweek,49 cutbacks on special retirement entitle-
ments,50 and the Law on Modernization of the Labor Market 2008, which
included a consent termination that eases the requirements of France’s
for-cause termination law.51
The United Kingdom and France are only two of the nations in which
shifts in political power usher in significant labor law reform.  The United
States is exceptional.  The demise of the EFCA and the WFA notwithstand-
ing seemingly favorable shifts in political power raises the question of why
labor law is so static in the United States.  Professor Cynthia Estlund pro-
vided an insightful analysis of the reasons for “ossification” of labor law in
the United States.52  The focus of this essay is to ponder why political
power shifts in other nations sometimes usher in major labor law reform,
while in the United States changes in political power result in little or no
change in labor law.53  The purpose of this essay is neither to blame nor
credit any politician or party for the static labor law of the United States
46. See Lawrence J. Speer, Labor Reform Tops Agenda of French President-Elect
Sarkozy, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-7 (May 11, 2007).
47. See Jennifer A. Dyer, Note, The Failure of France’s First Employment Contract:
Failing to Protect Jobs and Workers, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 503, 505
(2008) (discussing public outcry causing repeal of laws).
48. See George J. Terwilliger III, Impediments to Commercial Risk-Taking, 12 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 425, 429 (2008) (describing labor law changes under Sarkozy as
“sea change”); Dyer, supra note 47, at 516 (recounting Sarkozy’s plans for reform).
49. See Katrin Bennhold, Sarkozy Wins Battle to Loosen 35-Hour Workweek, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/world/europe/24iht-
france.4.14765628.html.
50. See William Pfaff, Sarkozy and the Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/opinion/16iht-edpfaff.1.8365141.html?_r=1&scp=
9&sq=sarkozy%20and%20unions&st=cse; see also (Government) Workers of the World
Unite!, supra note 37 (stating that “[m]illions of French workers marched against
Nicolas Sarkozy’s modest plans to raise the retirement age by two years”).
51. See Marjorie R. Culver et al., Employment Law, 43 INT’L LAW. 707, 710-11
(2009); Phillippe Despre`s, Common-Consent Termination Agreements Introduced, INT’L
L. OFF. (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Detail.
aspx?g=0cd9d194-dee8-43dc-8af6-22499e7148b1.
52. See Estlund, supra note 32.
53. Again, I distinguish between labor law and employment law.  As will be
discussed infra, both major political parties in the United States have supported
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nor to evaluate the merits of any particular reform.  Rather, this essay
presents ruminations on the reasons for the static labor law in the United
States in comparison with the changing labor law in many other nations.
III. RUMINATIONS ON STATIC LABOR LAW AMIDST POLITICAL
CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Labor Law-Employment Law Dichotomy
One key to understanding the stasis of labor law is appreciating the
distinction made in the United States between labor law and employment
law.  Labor law refers to one type of regulation of the workplace, and em-
ployment law refers to another.  Labor law is the name given to the law
governing labor-management regulation principally in unionized work-
places.54  Employment law, on the other hand, is the body of individual
employment rights law regulating non-unionized workplaces.55  Labor law
deals primarily with the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, which protect
the rights of employees to engage in collective bargaining and other forms
of collective action.56  Employment law encompasses the federal and state
statutes and state case law regarding individual employment rights.57  This
dichotomy is recognized neither in Europe nor in much of the rest of the
world, where the term labor law is used to describe the whole body of law
regulating the workplace.58
significant changes in employment law while they have paid minimal regard to
labor law reform.
54. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 2688; Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union Fed-
eral Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 489 (2001); cf. Richard
Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 215 (2007) (concluding that labor law and employment law
should not be considered independently).  It is worth noting that although the
NLRA principally governs representation and collective bargaining, workers who
are not represented by unions also have some rights under the Act. See, e.g., Wil-
liam R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old Is
New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259 (2002).
55. See Scalia, supra note 54, at 489.  In 1988, Professor Steven Willborn, dis-
cussing the labor law that is taught in law schools, observed that “[f]or the vast
majority of today’s workers and employers, labor law is relevant only to the extent
it considers individual employment rights, rights outside of the context of collec-
tive bargaining.”  Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard
Economic Objection, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101, 102 (1988); cf. Sachs, supra note 2, at 2721
(noting that workers in United States are turning to employment laws to provide
protection for their collective activity).
56. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Indi-
vidual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV.
687, 688 (1997); Scalia, supra note 54, at 490; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The
Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the
New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 575 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 56, at 688-89; Scalia, supra note 54, at 490; Stone,
supra note 56, at 576.
58. See generally Patrick Hardin, United States, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 23a-1 to 23a-3 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 1st ed. 1997).
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Given this distinction, one explanation for the stasis of labor law is
that, even if the Democratic Party generally supports employee rights and
protections, politicians of both parties long ago gave up on labor law and
opted for a regime of individual employment rights laws.59  Politicians in
the United States have not forsaken workplace regulation, but they have
turned their backs on laws that facilitate representation and collective bar-
gaining.  In the past two decades during which the WFA and the EFCA
failed,60 several employment laws of the individual employment rights va-
riety have been enacted in the United States, including: the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990;61 the Civil Rights Act of 1991;62 the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993;63 the ADA Amendments Act of 2008;64 the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008;65 and the Lilly Led-
better Fair Pay Act of 2009.66  The prospects were promising in 2010 for
59. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1571 (1996); Estlund, supra note 32, at 1539 (dis-
cussing lack of positive role for unions in many individual minimum rights laws);
Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liber-
alism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 73 (1999);
Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law, 47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 791, 794 (1998) [hereinafter Summers, Questioning] (explaining that “[t]he
Wagner Act has failed in its purpose only because collective bargaining has not
become the dominant pattern for managing employment relations”).
60. Beyond the last two decades, this cavalcade of employment laws can be
traced back to 1963: Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17
(2006)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-
202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)); Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2006)); Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (2006)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(k) (2006)); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA), Pub. L.
No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2006));
and Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), Pub. L. No.
100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09
(2006)).
61. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-17 (2006)).
62. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
63. Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006)).
64. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
65. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
66. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
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the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,67 which would amend Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation, but the likelihood of passage has diminished.  Notwithstand-
ing the expansion of employment law, the NLRA has not been signifi-
cantly amended since 1959.68
Organized labor supported passage of the individual rights laws, al-
though it was not obvious that the passage of such laws was in the best
interest of unions.69  It is arguable that the more such individual employ-
ment rights Congress bestows on employees, the less employees need un-
ions to bargain for rights through collective bargaining agreements.  Yet,
how could organized labor credibly take a different political position,
given that the individual employment rights laws help workers?  After al-
most fifty years of enactment of employment laws, it is not clear that such
laws have been a factor in the decline of unions.  On the other hand, it
also seems true that organized labor has not devised many effective ways to
use the employment laws to the mutual advantage of workers and
unions.70
Moreover, both political parties sometimes support the regulation of
the workplace through individual employment rights, further indicating
that politicians have given up on labor law and chosen to focus their ef-
forts on employment law instead.71  Why the disparity?  As we are rumi-
nating here, I offer several possible explanations.
67. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2010); see Kevin P.
McGowan, Congress May Turn to ENDA, Equal Pay Bill After Long Health Care Battle,
Speakers Say, Lab. Rel. Week (BNA) No. 24, at 502 (Apr. 1, 2010).
68. See Estlund, supra note 32, at 1535; Gould, New Labor Law Reform, supra
note 17, at 2.
69. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 59, at 168-69 (discussing important role of
organized labor in securing passage of federal employment discrimination laws);
see also Boyd Rogers, Note, Individual Liability Under the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993: A Senseless Detour on the Road to a Flexible Workplace, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1299,
1308-09 (1997) (discussing gradual building of support for FMLA among unions).
70. See William B. Gould IV, The Third Way: Labor Policy Beyond the New Deal, 48
U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 755-56 (2000) (“My National Labor Relations Board took
account of the need of unions to involve themselves in the wide array of new regu-
latory legislation that has become such a prominent part of the landscape during
this past quarter century.”).  For example, this array of federally granted and pro-
tected rights in employment laws may mean little in practice if the employees can-
not obtain representation, and many aggrieved workers cannot find attorneys to
take their cases and file lawsuits on their behalf. See Lewis L. Maltby, Employment
Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 106-07 n.3 (2003) (citing
Paul Tobias’s testimony before Dunlop Commission that plaintiffs’ employment
bar turns away 95% of potential plaintiffs); Ken May, Law Professor Urges Unions to
Arbitrate Workers’ Race Claims in Wake of Pyett, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at A-6
(Feb. 16, 2011) (quoting Professor Michael Green as saying that 95% of claimants
cannot get lawyer to take their case); see also infra note 78 (discussing under-repre-
sentation of workers with employment discrimination and employment law
claims).  Unions could educate employees about their rights and provide a means
of representation for employees with claims under employment statutes.
71. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 32, at 1530 (positing that Congress and fed-
eral judiciary “have grown unsympathetic to—even unfamiliar with—the collectiv-
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First, union density has declined in this nation since the 1950s and
even more precipitously since the 1970s, to the point that only about seven
percent of the private sector is unionized.72  Perhaps politicians do not
believe that collective bargaining law covers enough of the workforce to be
worth the effort and political capital it takes to pass such laws.73  In ex-
change for the number of votes that organized labor can deliver, the polit-
ical price of labor law reform is relatively high.  It takes much effort and
political capital to enact representation and collective bargaining laws be-
cause business interests concentrate their resources and lobbying efforts
on killing such laws.74  Consider, for example, the fierce opposition of
business organizations during the failure of the WFA75 and the EFCA.76
In contrast, employment laws do not attract the same level or intensity of
opposition.  Several employment discrimination laws were enacted at ap-
proximately the time the WFA and the EFCA were failing: the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990; the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008; and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008.  Moreover, two different Republican presidents named George Bush
signed all four of those bills into law.77
ist premises of the New Deal labor law regime as it falls increasingly out of sync
with the surrounding legal landscape”); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Cen-
tury Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 10 (1988) [hereinafter Sum-
mers, Labor Law as the Century Turns] (“The consequence is foreseeable, if not
inevitable; if collective bargaining does not protect the individual employee, the
law will find another way to protect the weaker party.”).
72. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 25, at 1; Gould, New Labor Law Reform, supra
note 17, at 3.
73. See infra notes 71-72 and infra Part III.B; see, e.g., (Government) Workers of the
World Unite!, supra note 37 (discussing former California Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger’s battles with state’s public unions).  It is worth noting that union density does
not necessarily correlate with coverage under collective bargaining agreements.  In
the United States, the correlation is a product of the decentralized collective bar-
gaining in which representation and collective bargaining predominantly take
place at the plant level.  In France, although union density is approximately the
same as in the United States, about ninety percent of French employees are cov-
ered by collective bargaining agreements. See G.J. Bamber & P. Sheldon, Collective
Bargaining: An International Analysis, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 585, 612 tbl.1 (Roger Blanpain
ed., 2007).  This divergence between union density and collective bargaining
agreement coverage in France is the result of a centralized collective bargaining
regime in which collective bargaining is predominantly at high levels, such as in-
dustry-wide. See id. at 613.
74. This powerful opposition mirrors the energy and money that individual
employers devote to efforts to defeat unions that launch organizing campaigns at
their workplaces. See, e.g., Summers, Questioning, supra note 59, at 794.
75. See Clifford Krauss, House Passes Bill to Ban Replacement of Strikers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A23.
76. See Steven Greenhouse, Bill Easing Unionizing Is Under Heavy Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A12; Steven Greenhouse, Fierce Lobbying Greets Bill to Help
Workers Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at B3.
77. President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA, Robert Pear, Congress Passes
Civil Rights Bill, Adding Protections for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A21,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (after vetoing its predecessor, the Civil Rights Act
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It is a seeming paradox that business interests fight legislation that
would strengthen labor laws—such as the WFA and the EFCA—with more
energy, time, and resources than they fight individual employment rights
laws.  Two possible explanations for this dissimilar treatment occur to me.
First, individual employment rights laws do not yoke employers to a collec-
tive bargaining representative and the concomitant duty to engage in
good faith bargaining with that representative for an extended period of
time.  The results of the collective bargaining process—i.e., what rights
and protections a collective bargaining agreement will confer on the cov-
ered employees—are uncertain, while the legal obligation to bargain and
work with and through the collective bargaining representative for a pe-
riod of time is certain.  It seems that businesses like neither the first uncer-
tainty nor the second certainty.  Another possible explanation is that
businesses understand that rights achieved through collective bargaining
are much more likely to be asserted through grievance and arbitration
procedures established in the corresponding agreements than are the
rights created in individual employment rights statutes.78
of 1990), Robert Pear, With Rights Fight Comes Fight to Clarify Congress’ Intent, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at A1.  His son, George W., signed the ADA Amendments
Act, Kevin P. McGowan, President Bush Signs into Law Bill to Broaden ADA’s Protec-
tions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 187, at AA-1 (Sept. 26, 2008), and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, Derrick Cain, Bush Signs Legislation to Prohibit
Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at A-1 (May
22, 2008).
78. The concern with the ability to assert individual employment rights claims
is two-fold.  First is the concern with overcrowded court dockets. See, e.g., Alan
Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 154 (1993) (“It would be hard, however, to find anyone
who believes that the nation has enough judges and courthouses to make common
law litigation the modal institution of employee grievance processing.”).  A second
and more significant concern with employees asserting claims is whether there are
enough lawyers willing to take the cases. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for
Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 467-
68 (1992) (“Because of litigation costs, all but middle and upper income employ-
ees are largely foreclosed from any access to a remedy for wrongful dismissal. . . .
Lower income employees without substantial tort claims will have difficulty finding
a lawyer.”); see also Leslie King, Mandatory Arbitration Better for Workers With EEOC,
Courts Stretched, Professor Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 151, at C-2 (Aug. 6, 1997)
(quoting Professor Theodore St. Antoine stating that experienced attorneys accept
only about one out of every hundred potential discrimination cases because they
are not worth their time).  The channeling of many employment claims to alterna-
tive dispute resolution has no doubt ameliorated the problems in having claims
heard in court.  Indeed, employers often have employees sign mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements.  There are, however, concerns with whether arbitration of indi-
vidual rights claims, without the involvement of a union, provides an even-handed
and effective adjudication of the employees’ claims. See Martin H. Malin, Privatiz-
ing Justice—But By How Much?  Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 589, 601-22 (2001) (discussing matters that courts should consider in
deciding whether to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements’ neutrality of arbi-
tral forum, arbitral control over discovery, restrictions on limitations periods and
remedies, allocation of arbitration costs, and mutuality regarding mandatory na-
ture of arbitration); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alter-
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A second reason that politicians have forsaken labor laws in favor of
employment laws may be that politicians can assess particular issues and
test the political winds on specific issues, such as family and medical leave,
genetic discrimination, and employer electronic monitoring of employees,
and then decide the political upside and downside without necessarily be-
ing placed in either the business or labor camp.  As mentioned, President
George W. Bush signed both the ADA Amendments Act and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act in 2008 and his father had signed the
ADA in 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.79  I doubt many would go so
far as to characterize either President Bush as having been in the camp of
organized labor.  In contrast, a politician who votes for labor law reform
favoring organized labor and collective bargaining is more likely to be be-
atified by labor and demonized by businesses and concomitantly to receive
the respective favors and punishments.80  Regardless of the position a poli-
tician takes on a labor law, it is likely to provoke attention and
opposition.81
native Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 43-
44 (1999) (discussing study results showing that repeat players and higher level
employees with resources for representation fare better in mandatory arbitration);
Marcela Noemi Siderman, Comment, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth Sav-
ing: Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title VII Protections, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1885,
1911-18 (2000) (discussing inadequacies of current mandatory arbitration systems,
including lack of public accountability, limited discovery, no jury, selection of arbi-
trators, advantage of repeat players, and limitation of remedies).  The EEOC has
opposed mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See generally
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002, POLICY
STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT (1997).  For a critique of the EEOC’s
position, see Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC’s Policy Against
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151 (1999).
In 1999, however, the EEOC launched a voluntary mediation program that has, by
the Commission’s account, been very successful. See EEOC’s Mediation Program Go-
ing Strong Despite Budget Shortfall, Coordinators Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at
B-1 (Mar. 27, 2000); Nancy Montwieler, Commission’s Voluntary Mediation Program Is
Off to Strong Start, Chairwoman Asserts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at A-3 (Dec.
3, 1999).
79. See supra note 74.
80. See, e.g., Jason Kosena, Both Sides on EFCA Set Sights on Bennet, THE COLO-
RADO STATESMAN, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/
99911-both-sides-efca-set-sights-bennet.  Although he was speaking of employment
laws, a statement by Deron Zeppelin, Director of Government Affairs for the Soci-
ety for Human Resource Management, illustrates the concern politicians have re-
garding being labeled based on one’s position on labor or employment bills: “Most
members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote on [employment] is-
sues, period.  It is not fun to be labeled either anti-worker or pro-business.  Most of
them will run for the hills before they have to vote on them.” See Michael Bologna,
Hill Watchers Foresee Little Activity on the Labor and Employment Law Front, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 153 (Aug. 9, 2001).
81. Consider the curious case of former Senator Arlen Specter.  Senator Spec-
ter became entangled with the EFCA: first, announcing that he would not vote to
invoke cloture to bring the bill to the Senate floor; then switching parties; then
proposing an amended version of the EFCA; and finally losing the Democratic
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A third reason for politicians’ preference for employment laws over
labor laws may be that the individual employment rights laws are imbued
with an approach to law and an ideology embraced by much of U.S. soci-
ety, whereas labor laws are based on an approach and ideology no longer
embraced by most of society.  Laws that are inconsistent with a society’s
values are not likely to survive.82  Thus, labor law may be a casualty of the
decline of collectivism and the rise of individualism in U.S. culture, soci-
ety, economy, and labor law.83  Although individualism has been part of
the American fabric throughout its history,84 it has in recent decades as-
cended while collectivism has declined.85  There was a period after the
Great Depression during which the Wagner Act was passed, in which a
collectivist approach held sway.86  That orientation changed after World
War II.87  According to Professor Estlund, “Congress and . . . the federal
judiciary, both . . . have grown unsympathetic to—even unfamiliar with—
the collectivist premises of the New Deal labor law regime as it falls in-
creasingly out of sync with the surrounding legal landscape.”88  Collectivist
primary despite having the support of the AFL-CIO. See Jeff Zeleny & Carl Hulse,
Specter, Running as Democrat, Ousted in Pennsylvania Primary, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2010, at A1 (discussing Senator Specter’s loss); Alec MacGillis, Specter Unveils Re-
vised EFCA Bill, WASH. POST CAPITOL BRIEFING BLOG (Sept. 15, 2009, 2:33 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitol-briefing/2009/09/specter_unveils_
prospective_de.html?hpid=news-col-blog (discussing Senator Specter’s involve-
ment with EFCA and position and party changes).
82. See, e.g., Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the USA:
Reflections on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 307, 310 (1994) (”The industrial relations system of any country is a subsys-
tem within that country, along with other subsystems such as the political system,
the economic system, the human relations system, and systems concerning human
values (culture).  A subsystem that is not in harmony with other subsystems will
either change those other systems so that harmony is established, or disappear.”).
83. Although the individualism so valued in the United States often is dis-
cussed along with the libertarian or laissez faire approach to government regula-
tion, I am not addressing the American affinity for limited government regulation
and intervention.  Libertarian values or not, the workplace will be regulated in
some way. See Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns, supra note 71, at 10.  Thus,
the point on which I focus is whether that regulation will be a collective or individ-
ual approach.
84. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation:
The Economic Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 602, 605 (2006); Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism, and Autonomy in
American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453 (2001) [hereinafter Summers,
Individualism].
85. See Fahlbeck, supra note 82, at 320-21; see also Schiller, supra note 59, at 73
(“Since the 1960s, the labor movement has suffered from American liberalism’s
rejection of the group basis of its own past and its inability to find a place for group
rights within the model of individual rights it clings to so dearly.”); cf. Summers,
Individualism, supra note 84, at 456 (positing that law of employment contracts as
developed by judges is permeated with “economic individualism of the late 19th
century”).
86. See Fahlbeck, supra note 82, at 320-21.
87. See id. at 320.
88. See Estlund, supra note 32, at 1530.
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approaches to problems still invoke protestations against Marxism, com-
munism, or socialism.  Dr. Rheinhold Fahlbeck observed that “[t]he
United States is not known as a land that propagates collectivist ways and
means; rather, rugged individualism is the hallmark.”89  Bringing the per-
spective of an outsider to an evaluation of the demise of labor law in the
United States, Dr. Fahlbeck concluded that the labor law of the nation is
discordant with fundamental values in American society, and therefore it
is doomed.90
B. Organized Labor’s Lack of Political Alternatives
Organized labor repeatedly puts its money and support behind candi-
dates who profess support for its priorities.  Nonetheless, even when those
candidates win, the laws fail.  The failures seem more the result of political
processes and shifts in political winds than a lack of resolve on the part of
the victorious politicians.  In this setting, what can labor do to achieve its
objectives?
If organized labor does not receive much return from Democrats,
then perhaps organized labor will make Democratic candidates whom it
supports pay a price.  By doing what?  Channeling support to Republicans?
Generally, that does not seem a viable threat, although it may be so in
specific elections.  Withdrawing from an active role in politics?  Perhaps,
but that seems to be a high-risk strategy.  Forming a new political party?
One sometimes hears calls for the formation of a labor party in the United
States.  Such calls were loud when President Clinton and the Democrats
were unable or unwilling to enact the WPA,91 and they may be renewed
with the demise of the EFCA under President Obama and the Democratic
Congress.  However, formation of a labor party in the United States seems
farfetched at this time,92 owing, at least in part, to the low union density,
public indifference toward unions, and a general lack of fervor for organ-
ized labor and collective action.93  At this time, the only emergent party or
89. See Fahlbeck, supra note 82, at 333.
90. See Fahlbeck, supra note 79, at 310 (“In the U.S., the system of labor and
industrial relations law is not in harmony with other subsystems.  Indeed, it seems
to me that the American labor and industrial relations legal system is in disaccord
with fundamental features of American society to such an extent that it is—and has
been ever since its enactment in 1935—by and large doomed.”)
91. See, e.g., The Labor Party Is Founded—But for What Purpose?, SPARK, Sept.-Oct.
1996, http://www.the-spark.net/csart132.html; Labor Party Advocates, NADER.ORG
(Aug. 5, 1994), http://www.nader.org/index.php?/archives/2014-Labor-Party-
Advocates.html.
92. See generally ROBIN ARCHER, WHY IS THERE NO LABOR PARTY IN THE UNITED
STATES? (2007).  For an interesting discussion of the association of labor with the
New Democratic Party in Canada and the failure of American labor to gain a foot-
hold in a labor party, see John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor
Movement, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 82 (2009).
93. Cf. Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise of Vol-
untarism?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 415, 415 (2010) (stating that “[u]nlike Europe, the
United States has no enduring labor party tradition”).
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\56-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 19 11-NOV-11 13:15
2011] “THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, . . .” 245
subparty in U.S. politics is the tea party, and it is not likely to be the cham-
pion of labor.
C. U.S. Exceptionalism and Lack of International Influences on U.S. Law
“American exceptionalism” is an in vogue phrase that is seldom ex-
plained but commonly accepted as expressing some truth.94  One aspect
of exceptionalism is that it often is used tautologically.  One can explain a
phenomenon as resulting from or being affected by exceptionalism or of-
fer the phenomenon as an example of exceptionalism itself.  In labor and
employment law, the United States is different from most of the rest of the
world in many important respects.  One difference is the labor law-employ-
ment law dichotomy discussed above.95  Another exceptional aspect of
U.S. employment law is the employment-at-will doctrine,96 which is the law
in forty-nine states in the United States and is the basis for the United
States’ reputation internationally as a hire-and-fire society.97
U.S. exceptionalism, although an amorphous concept, may help us
understand the stasis of U.S. labor law, and tautologically the stasis of U.S.
labor law is itself an example of American exceptionalism.  In short, when
a nation’s politicians and judges are relatively unconcerned about—and
sometimes proud of—their legal system’s divergences from the laws of
other nations and international standards and is resistant to consideration
of foreign or international standards, it is unsurprising that political
changes do not cause reexamination of the law in light of such distinctive
foreign and international standards.
Scholars have “unpacked” American exceptionalism by revealing sev-
eral faces.  First there is America’s human-rights narcissism, meaning the
United States’ embrace of the First Amendment and its “nonembrace of
certain rights . . . that are widely accepted throughout the rest of the
world.”98  Second is American judicial exceptionalism, by which U.S.
judges eschew laws and practices of other nations and international stan-
dards.99  Third is the United States’ employment of various methods to
94. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479, 1480 (2003) (“Since September 11, ‘American Exceptionalism’ has emerged
as a dominant leitmotif in today’s headlines.”).
95. See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
96. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our Boundaries: Transnational Employment
Law Practice and the Export of American Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite, 25 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 257, 305-06 (2004); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Practice of Interna-
tional Labor & Employment Law: Escort Your Labor/Employment Clients into the Global
Millennium, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 13 (2001) (“American businesses are steeped in their
unique and peculiar employment-at-will doctrine, which even other Anglo-system
countries like England, Canada, and Australia rejected years ago.”).
97. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century’s
End: Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 103-04
(1999).
98. Koh, supra note 95, at 1482.
99. Id.
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exempt itself from international rules and agreements, such as nonratifica-
tion, noncompliance, ratification with reservations, etc.100  Professor Koh
has come up with a modification of the third face, what he labels the “fly-
ing buttress mentality,” whereby the United States sometimes supports and
complies with international standards but refuses to ratify them, thus giv-
ing it a sense of sovereignty while complying.  Therefore, the United States
“has it both ways.”101  The fourth is double standards, describing situations
in which the United States advocates a different standard for the rest of
the world than that to which the United States adheres.102
With American exceptionalism unpacked in that way, it is possible to
see how at least the first three faces apply to the U.S. approach to labor
and employment law.  First, the United States was a world leader in devel-
oping an organized and articulated body of employment anti-discrimina-
tion law.  Although other nations and the European Union have surpassed
the United States in some respects, such as breadth of coverage, other
nations developed their employment discrimination law according to the
U.S. model.103  Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
United States has embraced employment nondiscrimination.  However,
the United States lags far behind many other nations and multinational
organizations regarding other employment rights, such as employment se-
curity and workplace privacy rights.104  The United States is the epitome
of a developed free market economy that is not very protective of employ-
ees.  It is known for its laissez faire approach to termination embodied in
the doctrine of employment-at-will.105
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1484-85.
102. Id. at 1485-86.
103. See NEIL REES, KATHERINE LINDSAY & SIMON RICE, AUSTRALIAN ANTI-DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 20 (2008) (“Australian anti-discrimi-
nation legislation has its roots in a statute enacted by the US Congress . . . .”);
Steven L. Willborn, Theories of Employment Discrimination in the United Kingdom and
the United States, 9 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 243, 243 (1976) (“While the roots of
U.S. law are found in English legal history, the roots of British discrimination law
are found in recent U.S. legal history.”); Shari Engels, Comment, Problems of Proof
in Employment Discrimination: The Need for a Clearer Definition of Standards in the United
States and the United Kingdom, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 340, 341 (1994) (stating Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was model for United Kingdom’s Race Relations Act).
104. See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 97, at 103-04 (“As is generally known, the
United States historically has provided comparatively meager formal legal protec-
tions of the employment relationship.  Foreign observers typically characterize us
as a ‘hire and fire’ society . . . .”).  Regarding the state of U.S. workplace privacy law
compared with that of European nations, see infra note 116.
105. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 96, at 13 (“American businesses are steeped
in their unique and peculiar employment-at-will doctrine, which even other Anglo-
system countries like England, Canada, and Australia rejected years ago.”); Clyde
W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65 (2000) (“The United States, unlike almost every
other industrialized country and many developing countries, has neither adopted
through the common law or by statute a general protection against unfair dismissal
or discharge without just cause, nor even any period of notice.”).  Unsurprisingly,
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Second, the United States is very insular and parochial in some areas
of law, and labor is among those.  There is a debate in this nation about
U.S. courts referring to foreign and international law.106  Courts rarely
refer to international or foreign sources in opinions involving labor or
employment issues.  Perhaps more important is the reluctance of the
United States to assume obligations under international labor standards.
The third facet of exceptionalism—whereby the United States ex-
empts itself from international rules and agreements or, as Professor Koh
suggests, supports and complies with them but refuses to ratify them—is
well illustrated in the approach of the United States to the International
Labour Organization (ILO).  The ILO is the agency of the United Nations
responsible for promulgating and overseeing international labor stan-
dards.107  The ILO has existed since 1919 and has 183 member nations.108
The labor standards that the ILO passes are conventions, and member
nations have an obligation to submit them to the proper national bodies
for consideration of ratification.
Although the United States is a member of the ILO,109 it has ratified
only fourteen of the ILO’s 188 conventions,110 and only two of the eight
fundamental conventions that undergird the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.111  This is not to say that U.S.
labor and employment law is inconsistent with many unratified ILO con-
ventions.  The United States has not ratified the fundamental conventions
the United States has not ratified the 1982 ILO Termination of Employment Con-
vention, which provides that “employment of a worker shall not be terminated
unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or
conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertak-
ing, establishment or service.”  Int’l Labour Org., Note on Convention No. 158 and
Recommendation No. 166 Concerning Termination of Employment, at iii, 1 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-normes/docu
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf (noting convention has been ratified
by thirty-two countries).
106. See generally Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign
Law, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 59 (2009).
107. About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
108. See id.; see also Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INT’L LABOUR
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last up-
dated May 19, 2011).
109. The United States withdrew from the ILO in 1977, but rejoined in 1980.
See Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States’ Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role,
11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 68-71 (1989).
110. The last ILO convention ratified by the United States was in 1999, when
the Senate unanimously approved and President Clinton signed Convention No.
182, The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. See Int’l Labour Org., U.S.
Ratifies ILO Convention Against the Worst Forms of Child Labour, ILO Press Release
ILO/99/43 (Dec. 2, 1999), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/
press-and-media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_071320/lang—en/index.htm.
111. See ILOLEX: Database of International Labour Standards, INT’L LABOUR ORG.
(2006), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (follow “United
States” hyperlink under “Click to display the ratifications for a country”).
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on freedom of association and nondiscrimination, although the United
States has national laws recognizing these rights.112  Thus, the United
States does not reject some international labor standards, but it also does
not fully embrace obligations under those standards.113  Another example
involving ILO standards illustrates the desire of the United States to with-
hold ratification while adhering to the standard and requiring other na-
tions to do so.  As mentioned, the United States has ratified only two of
the eight fundamental conventions upon which the four Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work are based.  Yet, when the United States con-
siders entering into an international trade agreement, U.S. law requires
the fundamental rights to be incorporated.114
When a nation feels little need to examine its standards in light of
foreign or international law, it seems less likely that political changes
within the nation will provoke significant law reform.  In contrast, when
Prime Minister Blair signed on to the European Union’s Social Charter in
1997, the United Kingdom committed itself to bringing its labor law into
conformity with the EU directives.115  The absence of significant interna-
tional influence means the United States is less likely to follow interna-
tional trends in labor law.116  It is worth noting, however, that the U.S.
government took some affirmative steps towards increased engagement
with the ILO in 2010, when Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis chaired the first
meeting of the President’s Committee on the International Labor Organi-
zation held in ten years.117  One of the stated goals of the Committee was
to work for Senate ratification of ILO Convention 111 on employment
112. See Estlund, supra note 32, at 1587-88 (explaining that United States does
not reject existence of international human rights in labor); Ratification of the Fun-
damental Human Rights Conventions by Country in the Americas, listing under ILOLEX:
Database of International Labour Standards, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/docs/declAM.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2011).
113. See Estlund, supra note, 32, at 1587-88.
114. See Okezie Chukwumerije, Obama’s Trade Policy: Trends, Prospects, and
Portends,  16 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39, 73-74 (2009) (citing OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2008 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
(2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2558); Sandra Polaski, Pro-
tecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 13 (2003).
115. See Shine, supra note 43, at 211.  For a discussion of the U.K. New Labour
government’s rhetoric about efforts to promote ILO core labor standards, see
Tonia Novitz, International Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: To What Extent Will the
Employment Relations Act 1999 Implement International Labour Standards Relating to
Freedom of Association, 63 MOD. L. REV. 379 (2000).
116. Consider, for example, that there are significant developments in the EU
regarding workplace privacy law, and U.S. law in this area remains relatively under-
developed. See Matthew W. Finkin, Some Further Thoughts on the Usefulness of Com-
parativism in the Law of Employee Privacy, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 11 (2010);
Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 331, 339 (2010).
117. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ILAB Release No. 10-0496-NAT, Secretary of Labor
Hilda L. Solis Chairs 1st Meeting of the President’s Committee on the International Labor
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discrimination, one of the ILO’s fundamental conventions, which was sub-
mitted to the Senate in 1998.118
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD
So where do these ruminations lead us?  How likely is it that signifi-
cant political changes in the United States ever will lead to significant
changes in labor law?
In an article published in 1998, Professor Samuel Estreicher hypothe-
sized about labor law reform in the United States in the year 2007 after the
collapse of the stock market.119  Escalating strikes resulted in a general
work stoppage that virtually stymied all production and distribution in the
nation.  At the behest of Congress and the President, business organiza-
tions petitioned the AFL-CIO to “develop new rules for constituting the
social order.”120
Well, 2007 came and with it came economic malaise in the United
States and the world, but no major change occurred in labor law in the
United States.  It was in this economic environment that the EFCA failed.
A commission was not even appointed to study labor law reform.
Experience over many years seems to demonstrate that the political
stars are unlikely to align for significant labor law reform.  We are likely to
continue on our course of enacting and amending employment laws.  As
for labor law, however, “the more things change, the more they remain
the same.”121  The adage accurately depicts the recent history and likely
future of politics and labor law in the United States.
Organization in 10 Years (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media
/press/ilab/ILAB20100496.htm.
118. See id.
119. See Samuel Estreicher, “Come the Revolution”: Employee Involvement in the
Workers’ State, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87 (1998).  Professor Estreicher’s hypothet-
ical proved quite prescient, as the latest recession, depression, or debacle began in
2007.
120. Id.
121. The famous adage is translated from French as, “The more things
change, the more they remain the same.” JEAN-BAPTISTE ALPHONSE KARR, LES
GUEˆPES (1849), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MOD-
ERN LITERATURE 443 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
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